China is currently being assiduously courted by this Labour Government on the desperate pretext for some much elusive economic growth; at any cost it appears. While China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and very influential in the World Health Organisation and other international bodies, this approach seems madness as China also presents a danger to Britain and the West. Indeed, it is public knowledge that China poses a significant risk and threat to our interests, and their malign influence needs to be responded to robustly. We simply cannot keep turning a blind eye to the endless hostile incursions and threats from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
On International Law
'Domestically and internationally, China conducts itself as an autocratic state. It has the most sophisticated domestic surveillance system in the world, Skynet, which as of 2023 has 700 million cameras—that is one lens for every two Chinese citizens. We must not be so naïve as to assume that if we end up in even greater strategic competition with China it will care at all about what agreement we have reached with Mauritius. We saw with Hong Kong how easily agreements made with third countries can be ignored, as China did there.
A submissive approach to third party calls on these issues displays an incredible naiveté about the world we live in and the direction we are travelling. Our previous positive disposition towards the role that these institutions could play was in a different era, when we expected a converging uniformity of basic values and democracy. That convergence is not happening; instead, our enemies are using our desire to stick to it as a weakness to exploit. They do not even recognise basic legal norms and institutions in their own countries; their own citizens do not benefit from legal protections and rights, and they do not believe in the rule of law full stop.
Do the Government really think that our enemies will put international legal obligations ahead of pursuing their own strategic interests? Of course not, yet we are expected to undertake a strategic surrender in the name of the rule of law in a way that advantages them, and on what basis—that they might look at what we have done and change their ways in the future, as they failed to do in Hong Kong? That is incredible naiveté.
It is not just the WTO (regarding intellectual property theft); the Chinese are supposed to follow the jurisdiction of international maritime courts, for example. The Government point to that as a reason why we should comply with them, but the Chinese break those rulings all the time, as we discussed in relation to the South China sea. They could not care less; they are restrained only by their strict self-interest. They pretend and play up the idea that they might follow the rules—when it does not suit, they do not follow them—yet we are supposed to follow the rules, because the aim is to get the Chinese on side. That is never going to happen.'
Dr Kieran Mullan MP British Indian Ocean Territory - Hansard - UK Parliament
Chinese investment in the UK.
The Belt and Road Initiative is a Chinese foreign policy initiative with a particular focus on infrastructure and energy projects, although it also encompasses wider trade and investment.
I recognise the potential risks that Chinese overseas investment can present. My colleagues and I are concerned that the BRI has created debt dependency, threatening many sovereign nations around the world, in addition to the very significant concerns about transparency and the negative local impacts some countries have experienced with BRI projects.
Of course, I do acknowledge that foreign investment and an active competitive economy can support growth, including here in the UK. Foreign investment can boost regional development, create new job opportunities, and lead to technology transfers, which may result in greater efficiency.
However, I also do appreciate key concerns associated with foreign investment. These can span issues including intellectual property, national security, and jobs. In terms of foreign critical infrastructure investment, such as investment into our nuclear sector, foreign businesses must satisfy the UK’s strong legal, regulatory and national security requirements, which are world-leading, and the investment must be subject to thorough scrutiny.
The National Security and Investment Act 2021 introduced appropriate safeguards to protect our national security and the safety of our citizens. The Act includes effective and efficient protocols in place to prevent hostile actors from targeting our country. As you may be aware, the powers included in the Act have now come into effect. Previously, our powers dated back to 2002 and, since then, there have been significant technological, economic and geopolitical changes while hostile actors have adopted novel and complex approaches.
It is my view, that China poses a systemic challenge to the UK's values and interests. I believe that, as outlined in the Integrated Review Refresh 2023, the UK should respond to this challenge along three interrelated strands. These strands are: strengthening our national security protections, engaging with China where it is consistent with our interests and deepening our cooperation, and alignment with our allies and partners.
Critical Industries
I believe Britain has to rethink their current approach of allowing Chinese companies to buy into our critical national industries. For instance, we have recently seen what has, in reality, been bad faith negotiations from Chinese company Jingye over the future of British Steel in Scunthorpe. The Business Secretary had ruled out doing business with a Chinese company in the steel sector again, though it appears the Government has, unsurprisingly, since rowed back on that. The Labour Government must now provide urgent clarity on the approach it plans to take towards Chinese companies attempting to buy influence in nationally strategic sectors.
Robust critical supply chains are essential in creating a more resilient economy which is far better placed to absorb and respond to geopolitical and economic shocks in future, or indeed, in the present. Like many, I am very concerned that our plan under Labour to import Chinese renewables, in headlong pursuit of Ed Miliband’s fever dream of Net Zero, is leaving Britain seriously over-reliant on China. Research has shown that China has a “near monopoly” in the supply chain of many of the minerals used in net zero technology, and dominates the market for batteries, wind turbines and solar.
Already, large areas of the countryside are being given over to solar farms, displacing local farmers and food production and so making the UK more reliant on imports from major polluters such as China for our energy infrastructure as well as being a threat to our own food security. I believe the closure of the largest manufacturer of fibreglass used in wind turbines in the UK because of cheap Chinese imports demonstrates that wind power requires a serious and risky reliance on foreign imports, weakening our energy security and therefore our national security.
The last few years have highlighted the importance of the UK, and indeed Europe, reducing its reliance on Russian oil. I do not believe the next step should be to make us dependent on China for critical minerals. The EU has recently proposed ‘Made in EU’ rules for strategic sectors, putting in place ‘strategic projects’ to reduce their dependence on China and other non-EU countries, with the aim of safeguarding European manufacturing industries and employment as well as addressing supply resilience and security.
UK Energy Infrastructure
I do believe China now poses a clear risk to our national security and the Labour Government should not threaten the UK's energy security by becoming even more reliant on imported Chinese energy infrastructure.
However, instead of working to end our reliance on energy infrastructure from China and support British industry and workers, this Labour Government instead chose to sign a new energy deal with China and, for months, refused to publish the details of this agreement as is the standard practice with such deals. Despite the security services having made clear the threat China poses to our national security, including the risk China might seek to disrupt our energy system, Ed Miliband signed the deal. As the Shadow Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero, Claire Coutinho MP said,
'He's committed us to 'cooperate' with the Chinese on: -Electricity grids (cables and inverters) -Battery storage -Offshore wind. In other words, making us even more dependent on China in all of the areas where they have complete dominance in global supply chains. This is serious… Security services across the West are warning us about the risks of Chinese involvement in our energy system…
We know China are not afraid to weaponise strategic dependence on their supply chains. They have already limited the export of critical minerals in their trade war with the US.
But Miliband has also completely stripped out a previous commitment that any deals struck with China should support and grow British supply chains. In other words, complete surrender to China at the expense of British industry.'
It should go without saying that the use of slave labour in any part of our supply chain is completely unacceptable. There is credible evidence that components used in many solar panels and wind turbines imported to the UK, most notably polysilicon from Xinjiang, are linked to the exploitation of Uighur Muslims by the Chinese Communist Party.
This is not a new issue, and yet it still took months before the Labour Government acted. While I welcome the amendment to the Great British Energy Act to ban the new state-owned energy company, GB Energy, from sourcing materials linked to modern slavery, the Government only made this decision after sustained political pressure from the Opposition and had previously ordered their MPs to vote down the very same amendment the month before, a belated realisation of a very real problem. In Ed Miliband’s deal, there is
'not a single word about Chinese solar panels being made with slave labour, or human rights abuses in Xinjiang.'
Not only do I believe the Government’s 2030 clean energy target is unrealistic but I am clear the United Kingdom cannot afford to rely on undemocratic regimes to deliver our energy infrastructure, nor can we allow our environmental ambitions to be built on the backs of exploited workers. I shall continue urging the back the Opposition's Cheap Power Plan to end our reliance on hostile foreign actors such as China for our energy future.
China remains, of course, an important trading partner for the UK. So long as we work to avoid dependencies in our critical supply chains and protect our national security, a positive trade and investment relationship could benefit UK businesses. I will encourage Ministers to work with industry to ensure trading and investment is safe, reciprocal, adheres to human rights law and is mutually beneficial.
Higher Education Institutions
Academic freedom and freedom of speech are essential for our academic institutions and a principle we should never deviate from. Any undermining of that freedom by another country is completely unacceptable and must be stopped. The specific reports about what occurred at Sheffield Hallam University demonstrate how China sought to undermine this freedom. It is particularly telling that it did so about research regarding the forced labour of Uyghur Muslims in the north-western region of Xinjiang, an issue that same researcher had been attacked for by the Chinese Communist owned press in 2022. Therefore, it would be disgraceful if the university sought to stop this research on the basis of Chinese state pressure.
As you may be aware, the last Conservative Government took steps through the National Security Act 2023 to make sure that assisting a foreign intelligence service is illegal. As I understand it, the university has been reported to the police for breaching this law. It must robustly investigate this allegation, as any infringement on academic freedom by the Chinese state is repugnant and must be stopped.
More broadly, Chinese interference is undeniably taking place across our universities. Professors are being leant on, and vital research is being silenced However, the current Government has still not implemented the previous Government’s Higher Education Freedom of Speech Act in full to ensure that academic freedom is protected on our campuses. I urge it to do so. In fact, I urge the Government to take a stronger approach to pernicious Chinese activity within our educational and research institutions.
Cyber Security
The targeting of our democratic institutions is completely unacceptable, and I am glad to say that, to this date, cumulative attempts to interfere with UK democracy and politics have not been successful. To this end, the UK Government, alongside its international allies, has identified the Chinese state-affiliated organisations and individuals who were responsible for two malicious cyber campaigns targeting democratic institutions and parliamentarians. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) - a part of GCHQ - assesses that the UK Electoral Commission systems were likely compromised by a Chinese-state affiliated entity between 2021 and 2022. The NCSC also assesses it is almost certain the Chinese state-affiliated Advanced Persistent Threat Group 31 (APT31) conducted reconnaissance activity against UK parliamentarians during a separate campaign in 2021.
I understand the majority of those targeted were prominent in calling out China’s malign activity. The United States has designated the same persons and entities as the UK Government for malicious cyber activity. They, too, have taken action against the same hacking group that has spent approximately 14 years targeting US and foreign criticism, espionage and foreign intelligence objectives.
The UK rightly takes all accusations of foreign interference very seriously. There are robust national security safeguards in place in the UK, and significant legal and political oversight, to ensure that any such hostile action is unsuccessful. This ensures that sensitive data is protected and potentially dangerous persons are identified. Parliamentarians must be able to highlight issues relating to the Chinese state without sanction, including calling out abuses in Xinjiang and the curtailment of freedom in Hong Kong.
Following a review of security risks, the previous Government instructed departments to end the use of surveillance equipment produced by companies that are subject to the National Intelligence Law in China. I understand the Government has confirmed this work has now been completed and this equipment has now been replaced. However, we need to remember that China’s national security laws require Chinese companies to share data with the government.
I am aware that the Chinese Strategic Risks Institute have warned that Chinese EVs could transmit sensitive data back to China or even be remote controlled. I am also aware of a report by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory that raises concerns about Chinese EVs eavesdropping on conversations and described them as “mobile spying platforms”.
As a result, the Ministry of Defence issued a notice to their staff telling them not to discuss secrets in MoD EVs sourced from China and have banned some EVs sourced with Chinese components from being parked near sensitive military basis. Colonel Philip Ingram said that “modern vehicles are not just cars but computer systems with built-in surveillance and sensors that can send data back to manufacturers”. Defence companies have also warned staff not to plug phones into Chinese EVs or connect via Bluetooth.
In July 2025 the Transport Minister Lilian Greenwood confirmed that Chinese EVs would not qualify for a grant under the Government’s £650 million electric car grant scheme. However, in July 2024 the then Business Secretary, Jonathan Reynolds, said that the UK would not follow the US and EU in imposing tariffs on Chinese EVs nor was he directing the Trade Remedies Authority to launch an investigation into Chinese EV imports despite Chinese state subsidies into the sector. Concerns have been raised that by not levelling tariffs, the Chinese will instead funnel EVs to Britain in an effort to escape EU tariffs.
Chinese Espionage
Constituents may be aware that three more men have recently been arrested, under the National Security Act, on suspicion of spying for China; I shall be following this case very closely as I still have grave concerns about Chinese espionage and the collapse of the last China spy case. Allowing that case to collapse has sent the message to our enemies that the UK will not stand up to adversarial foreign powers and will only encourage further hostile acts by China.
The first two men accused of spying for China were charged under the last Government. However, it was this Government's refusal to provide the evidence requested by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) for the trial to go ahead that led to its collapse. The Director of Public Prosecutions, Stephen Parkinson, has gone on public record to say the CPS asked the Government for months to provide the evidence needed to go ahead with the case, to no avail.
Legal experts such as the Professor of Public Law at the University of Cambridge, Mark Elliot, have noted that an 'enemy' under the Official Secrets Act is simply any state that represents a "current threat to the national security of the UK". The previous Government made this fact clear on a number of occasions, such as in the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy published in 2021 which described China as "the biggest state-based threat to the UK’s economic security". There was therefore no reason why the Labour Government could not have provided the evidence requested by the CPS.
The public rightly expects to learn why the Labour Government allowed those accused of spying for China to walk free and whether the Government intervened in any way with the independent Crown Prosecution Service's decisions on this case. The Opposition forced a vote in Parliament requiring the Government to publish details of the meetings it had about the China spy case, however, the Government voted against this motion and, in doing so, made clear it has no intention of making this information public.
The Security Service has made it clear that China continues to try and spy on Parliamentarians and poses an ongoing threat to our national security. I shall continue urging Ministers to release the information it holds on Chinese espionage and hold the Government to account on its national security failings. Keir Starmer and Labour still have serious questions to answer -Ministers must come clean with Parliament and the public, but it appears that, once again Starmer's gut instinct was not to protect our national security. Indeed, since entering office, Starmer has repeatedly watered down the Conservative Government's China policy, including by appointing Jonathan Powell as his National Security Adviser - a figure from the Blair years with close links to China. We shall see how this latest espionage investigation unfolds.
Shadow cabinet office minister Alex Burghart MP has said: "Unless the United Kingdom stands up to these threats, our country will continue to be treated with disdain."
Human Rights and FoRB
With regards to human rights and fundamental freedoms, the Labour Government should make clear that China must act in line with its obligations under international law. The UK should not shy away from challenging China where deep concerns exist about its conduct, such as on human rights violations in Tibet and against the Uyghur Muslims and other minorities in Xinjiang.
I also remain deeply concerned about restrictions on freedom of religion or belief in China, including the persecution of Christians, Muslims, Buddhists and Falun Gong practitioners. I am shocked by the Chinese state's efforts to close house churches and the prohibitions levelled against minors involved in religious activities, including young people who wish to attend Sunday schools. The current Labour Government must continue to hold the Chinese Government to account where FoRB restrictions are apparent.
I believe the UK must continue to promote and protect the freedom of religion or belief for all where it is threatened, including through the UN, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the International Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance.
My colleagues and I are also deeply concerned about the abuse of human rights that the Chinese authorities are responsible for and the threats they pose to pro-democracy campaigners, including Hong Kongers living in the UK on whose heads the Chinese authorities have placed bounties. The situation of British national Jimmy Lai, recently imprisoned for 20 years in Hong Kong, is unacceptable and needs to be roundly addressed by the Government.
Conclusion
Despite these many and very significant issues, current UK Ministers continue to kowtow to the Chinese Communist Party, even helping them to secure planning permission for their proposed super embassy in London. You can read my statement on that issue here:
Mims Davies MP Statement on the Proposed Chinese Embassy - an Update | Mims Davies
They are also refusing to place China on the enhanced tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme, a measure that the previous Government introduced to provide greater assurance around the activities of certain foreign powers or entities that are a national security risk. The Government's failure to defend Britain’s national interests and security is an ongoing concern.
It is clear the Labour Government’s approach to China is putting our country at risk and, to echo the words of the Shadow Foreign Secretary, the Prime Minister needs to be honest about what he intends to compromise in his pursuit to make friends with China. We need to protect our sectors and find a better way forward than where we are now. That can be in no doubt.
I will continue to question the Government’s approach to China and press their Ministers to focus on strengthening our national security in those areas where the actions of the Chinese Communist Party pose a threat. Our country needs to challenge this situation and not the people of China.
